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Abstract 
Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) are an increasingly important part of the global trading 
system. At the same time Border Carbon Adjustments (BCAs) are begining to be considered a 
necessary policy tool to address the carbon leakage and competitiveness concerns associated with 
emissions pricing systems. This confluence of events begs the question – Is there a useful role for 
BCAs in the implementation of PTAs?  This paper provides an initial review of the rationale for going 
this policy direction, options for implementing BCAs through PTAs, and the legal implications of 
these options.  
 
The paper argues that the inclusion of BCAs in PTAs has several distinct advantages: it may avoid 
the trade retaliatory measures that could arise from the unilateral imposition of BCAs, it does not rely 
on cumbersome and often ineffective multilateral discussions, and it might be more legally feasible 
as it provides a method of, to some extent, circumventing barriers to the unilateral imposition of 
BCAs posed by WTO rules. The paper explores policy options for implementing BCAs through PTAs, 
incuding looking at the importance of the BCA rate, the role of rules of origin, and the manner in 
which bilateral negotiations can help along the implementation process, even in cases where BCAs 
are, in the end, implemented unilaterally. The paper concludes that PTAs can indeed play a useful 
role in implementing BCAs, suggesting that this is a policy worth further exploration.   
 
                                                 
1 Kateryna Holzer is a Doctoral Fellow at the World Trade Institute and participant in the Swiss 
National Centre of Competence in Research on Climate Change (NCCR Climate) and Swiss 
National Centre of Competence in Research on Trade Regulation (NCCR Trade Regulation). 
Nashina Shariff is a graduate student at the University of Bern pursuing a Masters in Climate 
Sciences. Research for this paper was funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation. 
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The Inclusion of Border Carbon Adjustments in Preferential Trade 
Agreements: Policy Implications 
 
Kateryna Holzer and Nashina Shariff 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Preferential trade agreements (PTAs) are growing in importance in globally. In 1990 
there were approximately 70 preferential trade agreements in place, by 2010 there 
were around 300.2 Free trade agreements make up around three quarters of the PTAs.3 
According to the EU: 
 
Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), if approached with care, can build on WTO 
and other international rules by going further and faster in promoting 
openness and integration, by tackling issues which are not ready for 
multilateral discussion and by preparing the ground for the next level of 
multilateral liberalization.4
 
Border carbon adjustments (BCAs) as trade related climate policy measures have also 
been increasing in prominence in global discussions. In countries with stringent carbon 
pricing systems in place BCAs can be used to charge a carbon price on imports and 
rebate the carbon price on exports. These measures are primarily aimed at addressing 
two trade related concerns: 
1) Competitiveness concerns – concerns that industries that face higher costs due 
to carbon prices may become less competitive and as a result lose global 
                                                 
2 World Trade Report 2011 - The WTO and preferential trade agreements:  From co-existence to 
coherence (WTO 2011), at p. 6.  
3 The WTO Agreement distinguishes between two types of PTAs – “a free trade area, FTA” 
and “a customs union, CU”. A free-trade area is defined as “a group of two or more customs 
territories in which the duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce … are eliminated 
… between the constituent territories…”.  A customs union is defined as “the substitution of a 
single customs territory for two or more customs territories, so that (i) duties and other 
restrictive regulations of commerce are eliminated … between the constituent territories of the 
union” (i.e. not to all WTO members on an MFN basis) This paper concentrates on the former 
form of PTAs as the most relevant in the context of BCA practice. BCAs are considered 
primarily in trade relations between developed and advanced developing countries, which are 
unlikely to go beyond FTAs for a higher level of integration of a customs union. 
4 Global Europe: Competing in the world - A contribution to the EU’s Growth and Jobs Strategy 
(European Commission 2006), at p. 10, available on the Internet at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/october/tradoc_130376.pdf (last accessed on 18 March 2012). 
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market share to competitors in countries that do not have commensurate 
policies in place.5 
2) Carbon leakage – the concern that carbon reductions could be diluted by 
increased production in more carbon intensive countries.6 
The proliferation of these two policies raises the question of whether BCAs may have 
some role to play in the upcoming PTAs.  
 
The following paper explores this question. It begins by providing some background 
on PTAs and BCAs. It goes on to address the question of whether BCAs can usefully 
play a role in PTAs by exploring the rationale for such a system. Finally, it explores 
options for implementing BCAs through PTAs and the legal implications of these 
options. 
 
II. Background 
 
1. Preferential Trade Agreements  
 
It is widely understood that multilateral agreement on trade issues provides the most 
efficient means of encouraging trade globally.7 PTAs are criticized because while they 
can increase trade among PTA parties they can also decrease trade with non-PTA 
parties, leading to welfare losses.8 None the less, many countries see PTAs as a means 
to move forward on issues that can find no resolution at the multi-lateral level.9 As a 
result while some see PTAs as “termites” in the multi-lateral system,10 many view 
them as a catalyst that can push the multi-lateral trading system towards the desired 
level of openness.  
 
                                                 
5 L. Parker and J. Blogdett, “Carbon Leakage” and Trade: Issues and Approaches, Congressional 
Research Services Report for Congress (Congressional Research Service 2008), at p. 1, available 
on the Internet at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40100.pdf (last accessed on 30 April 2012). 
6 Ibid. 
7 See e.g. World Trade Report 2011 at note 2, at p. 94. 
8 World Trade Report 2011 at note 2, at p. 100. 
9 EC 2006 at note 4. 
10 J. Bhagwati, Termites in the Trading System: How Preferential Agreements Undermine Free Trade 
(Oxford University Press 2008). 
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The 300 PTAs currently in force include the participation of practically all WTO 
members - both developed and developing countries.11 Importantly, trade 
liberalization is not the only driver for the conclusion of PTAs. In fact, preferential 
tariff margins constitute no more than 1% of trade due to the already low Most 
Favoured Nation (MFN) tariffs12, particularly on industrial products, that have arisen 
as a result of a series of liberalization rounds in the GATT/WTO.13 As such, 
negotiations under PTAs have increasingly been used to promote non-trade policy 
objectives, known as WTO-X commitments, including environmental and labour 
standards.14
 
Although PTAs constitute a separate trade regulatory system, it has been subject to 
compliance with the multilateral trade system since the conclusion of the GATT in 
1947. GATT Article XXIV establishes requirements of the multilateral trade system to 
regional and bilateral trade relations and thereby facilitates coexistence and coherence 
of trade relations at the two levels.15 The WTO normative framework of regional trade 
is based on the common understanding that the formation of PTAs implies the 
liberalization of trade on a non-MFN basis, which is a derogation from the MFN 
obligations of countries under the WTO Agreement. This derogation of MFN 
treatment under PTAs is however foreseen, and thus permitted, by WTO rules.16  
 
                                                 
11 World Trade Report 2011 at note 2, at pp. 54-57. 
12 Under the WTO rules, tariffs applied to the most favoured nation (i.e. the lowest rate a 
country applies) must be applied by the WTO member country in normal (non-preferential) 
multilateral trade relations to all imports irrespective of their origin. These tariffs are known 
as MFN tariffs. 
13 Ibid., at p. 86. 
14 Ibid., at p. 63 and pp. 128-129. 
15 With the creation of the WTO, separate requirements, albeit similar to those in GATT Article 
XXIV for trade in goods under PTAs, were made in GATS Article V for trade in services under 
PTAs. See T. Cottier & M. Foltea „Constitutional Functions of the WTO and Regional Trade 
Agreements“, in L. Bartels & F. Ortino (eds.) Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO Legal 
System (Oxford University Press 2006), at p. 47. There is also a separate set of WTO 
requirements that apply to PTAs formed solely between developing countries in the Enabling 
Clause. The Enabling Clause was originally a Decision of GATT contracting parties in 1979 on 
Differential and more favourable treatment, reciprocity and fuller participation of developing 
countries, whose main purpose was to allow unilateral (non-reciprocal) preferences of 
developed countries to developing countries. Since the creation of the WTO, the Enabling 
Clause has received a status of a permanent exception to GATT rules.  
16 For instance, paragraphs 5 and 8 of GATT Article XXIV provide that, subject to certain conditions, 
“the provisions of … [the GATT] shall not prevent, as between the territories of contracting parties, the 
formation of a customs union or of a free-trade area”.  
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While PTAs began in the form of regional trade agreements, finding its roots in the 
increasing regionalism in Europe in the 1950s,17 they have now expanded beyond 
regional blocks so that today, half of all PTAs are not regional in nature.18 There is 
also a particular rise in PTAs between developed and developing nations. In 2005, of 
the 141 PTAs in goods in place, 36 were between developed and developing nations.19  
 
Major developed nations including the U.S. and the EU have been expanding the 
number of these agreements in the past few years and are looking to further expand it 
in the future. Currently, the U.S. has PTAs in place with a wide variety of countries. 
Agreements include the North American Free Trade Agreement and the Dominican 
Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreements. It also has PTAs in place with 
Australia, Bahrain, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Oman, and Singapore. It has recently 
signed PTAs with Columbia, Korea and Panama that are not yet in force and it is 
working on an Asia Pacific trade agreement known as the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Agreement.20    
 
Through its Global Europe Strategy the EU is also currently pursuing a strategy of 
negotiating PTAs with a number of countries.21 PTAs have recently been concluded 
with South Korea and Chile. It is also currently negotiating agreements with the 
Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), Canada, the Gulf Cooperation 
Council, India, Malaysia, Singapore and the Ukraine.  China has also been identified 
as meeting the economic criteria for new PTA partners, though the Commission notes 
that it presents special opportunities and risks.22
 
                                                 
17 World Trade Report 2011 at note 2, at p. 6. 
18 World Trade Report 2011 at note 2, at p. 6. Hence, the term “Preferential Trade Agreements” 
is more proper than the traditional term “Regional Trade Agreements”. 
19 J. Crawford  and R. V. Fiorentino, “The Changing Landscape of Regional Trade 
Agreements”, World Trade Organization Discussion Paper (WTO: Geneva 2005). 
20 Office of the United States Trade Representative – Executive Office of the President, 
available on the Internet at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements  (last accessed on 
18 March 2012). 
21 EC 2006 at note 4. 
22 EC 2006 at note 4, at p. 11. 
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The north-south PTAs that are so prevalent in these negotiations may be of particular 
relevance to the BCA debate as it is between developed and developing countries that 
the gap in climate policies is most pronounced. 
 
2. Border Carbon Adjustments 
 
BCAs are taxes or regulations imposed on the importation or exportation of goods as 
an adjustment of domestic carbon-related measures (carbon taxes, emissions 
allowance requirements etc.) at the border. BCAs have been widely discussed in recent 
times and have shown up in numerous policy proposals. Most notably, the Waxman 
Markey Bill proposed in the U.S. looked at requiring importers to submit allowances 
to account for their emissions.23 They have also been discussed in the context of 
European policy. While currently carbon leakage and competitiveness concerns are 
dealt with in the European Union’s Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) primarily 
through the free allocation of allowances, the EU notes that a “carbon equalization 
system” could be put in place to put energy intensive industries that are at significant 
risk of carbon leakage on a comparable footing with those in third countries.24 Most 
recently, by including international aviation in the EU ETS the EU has essentially put 
the idea of “carbon equalization” in practice.25
 
a. Purpose and effectiveness of BCAs 
 
Addressing the competitiveness impacts on industry is arguably the most important 
role of BCAs. Competitiveness concerns are intertwined with carbon leakage concerns 
arising primarily from the Pollution Haven Hypothesis which predicts that 
“…liberalized trade in goods will lead to the relocation of pollution intensive 
                                                 
23 H.R. 2454 -- American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, Section 767 c) and 768,  available 
on the Internet at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?c111:4:./temp/~c111t5xdS0:: (last accessed on 18 
March 2012). 
24 Directive 2009/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 amending 
Directive 2003/87/EC so as to improve and extend the greenhouse gas emission allowance trading 
scheme of the Community Text with EEA relevance, Official Journal L 140, 05/06/2009 P. 
0063 – 0087, Section 25.
25 The EU requires domestic and foreign passenger and cargo airlines to surrender emissions 
allowances on flights starting and ending in EU airports, The measure, which was enacted by 
the EU ETS Directive on 1 January 2012, has evoked international opposition threatening to 
escalate in retaliations, litigations and trade wars. This issue is currently being dealt with 
through consultations among countries in the International Civil Aviation Organisation 
(ICAO) in the hopes of settling these disputes in an amicable manner. 
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production from high income and stringent environmental regulation countries, to low 
income and lax environmental regulation countries.”26 Results confirming this 
hypothesis are mixed, none-the-less, these issues have featured prominently in the 
climate change debate.27
 
A number of studies have been completed in an attempt to quantify the impacts of 
carbon leakage from the enactment of carbon pricing policies. For example, the 
IPCC’s fourth assessment estimates carbon leakage rates that would result from action 
under Kyoto range from 5 to 20%.28 A number of other studies have estimated leakage 
impacts from the implementation of the EU’s post-2012 climate policies, the results 
show that leakage could range from 2% to greater than 100%, based on a number of 
different modeling assumptions.29 The OECD has stated definitively the likelihood of 
carbon leakage, indicating that “[m]odel simulations indicate that the use of economic 
instruments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions is likely to have negative impacts on 
the international competitiveness position of some industrial sectors, especially when 
such instruments are implemented in a non-global manner.”30 An IISD study shows 
that the likelihood of carbon leakage is most significant in the long-run, when the 
mobility of resources increases and countries will choose to make their new 
investments in “pollution havens”.31
 
                                                 
26 M.S. Taylor, “The Pollution Haven Hypothesis - Unbundling the Pollution Haven 
Hypothesis” 4 (2) Advances in Economic Analysis & Policy (2004), at p. 3. 
27 For example, a review of recent studies found “statistically significant pollution haven effects of 
reasonable magnitude.” However, a review of U.S. manufacturing between 1972 and 1994 found that 
while trade liberalization occurred and U.S. manufacturers reduced pollution “[a] shift toward cleaner 
industries has also occurred among U.S. imports”. See Ederington et al., “Trade Liberalization and 
Pollution Havens”, 4 (2) Advances in Economic Analysis & Policy (2004) and L. Parker and J. 
Blogdett“Carbon Leakage” and Trade: Issues and Approaches, Congressional Research Services 
Report for Congress (2008), at p. 1. 
28 T. Barker et al., “Mitigation from a cross-sectoral perspective”, in B. Metz, et al.  (eds.), 
Climate Change 2007: Mitigation. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fourth Assessment Report 
of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge University Press 2007), at p. 622. 
29 L. Parker and J. Blogdett, at note 5. 
30 The Political Economy of Environmentally Related Taxes, Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, Executive Summary, at p. 2, available on the Internet at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/27/23/36966499.pdf (last accessed on 18 March 2012). 
31 P. Wooders and A. Cosbey, “Climate-linked tariffs and subsidies: Economic aspects 
(competitiveness and leakage) ”, TAIT Conference Background Paper (2010), at p. 4, available 
on the Internet at http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/climate_jun10_e/climate_jun10_e.htm (last 
accessed on 18 March 2012). 
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A recent OECD study notes that there is a growing consensus among computable 
general equilibrium (CGE) modelers that the overall impacts on carbon leakage from 
emissions pricing policies are nominal, however energy intensive industries that are 
exposed to international competitiveness may none the less see sizable impacts. There 
is little research available on whether BCAs do in fact reduce carbon leakage. 
However this OECD study concludes that BCAs can reduce leakage for small 
coalitions of acting countries such as the EU.32
 
BCAs have also been suggested to have other purposes. By taxing imports they place a 
carbon price on the emissions of goods consumed, which can be important from an 
environmental perspective. For example, studies have shown that in the US 7.3 per 
cent of emissions are related to imports, for Germany this value is 16.6 per cent and 
for Switzerland it is as high as 122.9 per cent.33 They may also provide an incentive 
for developing countries to adopt their own carbon pricing policies, as in this way 
those countries would be able to collect the revenue from the policy themselves and 
invest it in low carbon technologies in their own countries.  
 
b. Design of BCAs 
 
The design of BCAs will have impacts on their ability to address competitiveness 
concerns, their effectiveness in accomplishing climate policy goals as well as on the 
likelihood that BCAs will in fact be considered consistent with international trade law.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There are a number of ways BCAs can be designed. 34   
                                                 
32  J. Burniaux, “Is there a Case for Carbon-based Border Tax Adjustment? An Applied 
Equilibrium Analysis”, OECD Economics Department Working Papers no. 794, available on the 
Internet at 
http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/displaydocumentpdf/?cote=ECO/WKP(2010)50&doclanguage=en (last 
accessed on 18 March 2012). 
33 G. P. Peters and E. G. Hertwich, “CO2 Embodied in international trade with implications for 
global climate policy”, 42 (5) Environmental Science and Technology (2008), at pp. 1401-1407.
34 This discussion applies to import side BCAs. Export rebates normally but not necessarily 
accompany import border adjustments in order to level playing field for exporters in world 
markets.  With respect to their form, export rebates should mirror import BCAs, e.g. if the 
import-side BCA taxes emissions based on best available technology (BAT), exporters would 
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1) Processes and production methods (PPMs) – the BCA level is set by applying 
the carbon price to the actual emissions in imported products (i.e. based on the 
emissions level in industries of the exporting country). 
2) Best Available Technology (BAT) – the BCA is applied based on some 
benchmark linked to the best (least carbon-intensive) technology commercially 
available for producing the product. This benchmark could be based on the best 
available technology in the importing country, the exporting country or both. 
3) Predominant method of production (PMP) - a technology that has a 
considerable market share in the importing country is used as a benchmark 
(e.g. 60% of the firms in the corresponding sector of the importing or exporting 
country).35  
4) Average emissions – either of the importing or exporting country.  
 
BCA levels can also be set based only on direct emissions, i.e. the emissions directly 
emitted in the production of the product or using indirect emissions as well, which 
would include upstream emissions, for example the emissions from the production of 
electricity used in the production of the product.  
 
PPM based methods for applying BCAs are the most effective means of putting in 
place BCAs from an emissions reduction perspective. Under this method the actual 
emissions created in the production of the product is used to set the BCA rate, as a 
result the BCA captures the full carbon impact of the product. This is also the method 
that would be considered by domestic producers to do the most to address 
competitiveness concerns as it treats foreign and domestic producers in exactly the 
same manner.  
 
BAT based BCAs on the other hand would be less effective than PPM based methods 
from an emissions reduction perspective. If carbon emissions are taxed based on BAT 
in the importing country only a portion of imported emissions will face a carbon price 
and as a result the product would not face the full extent of the desired price signal. In 
this case foreign producers would face fairly low prices, meaning they are no worse 
                                                                                                                                             
receive a rebate based on BAT as well, in order to avoid the situation where domestic 
producers who intend to sell their products on the domestic market would find it economic to 
export and re-import their products in order to lower their carbon costs.  
 
35 The PMP can be calculated based on the emissions levels only within the the importing country’s 
sector or it can be the PMP used in the entire world. See Matthew Genasci “Border Tax Adjustments 
and Emissions Trading: The Implications of International Trade Law for Policy Design”, 1 CCLR 
(2008), at p. 37. 
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off than domestic producers and will likely be better off than those domestic producers 
with emissions intensities greater than BAT. From the perspective of domestic 
producers this could put foreign producers at an unfair advantage because they face a 
less stringent climate policy.  
 
PMP based BCAs would do more to address carbon leakage and the competitiveness 
concerns of domestic producers. A PMP method would likely have a higher 
benchmark level than BAT thereby pricing more but again not all emissions of 
imported products. It would also mean that imported products faced a price 
comparable to that which the majority of the domestic industry face, meaning it is 
likely to go further towards addressing the competitiveness concerns of domestic 
industry.  
 
The effect of BCAs based on average emissions would depend on whether the average 
emissions of the importing or the exporting country are used. If the average emissions 
of the importing country is used its effect would be similar to the PMP method, pricing 
more emissions than BAT and placing a price on foreign goods that is comparable to 
that faced by most domestic producers. On the other hand if average emissions in the 
exporting country are used the result is similar to the PPM method. Emissions will be 
close to fully priced therefore the system will be more effective from the perspective 
of accomplishing climate policy goals, foreign producers will also face prices that are 
more reflective of their actual emissions and therefore would be treated in almost the 
same manner as domestic producers.  
 
c. Legality of BCAs 
 
The legal implications of BCAs have been widely examined in the literature.36 
However there is no clear consensus on the legality of such measures, rather it likely 
depends on their design.   
                                                 
36 This paper focuses on the adjustment of carbon taxes at the border as the most general case, 
with the same basic rules applying to the adjustment of emissions allowance systems. 
However, it is important to note that non-fiscal domestic measures (regulations) can also be 
adjusted at the border. Their adjustment is subject to the MFN and the national treatment 
principles under Articles 2.1 and 2.2, respectively, of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to 
Trade (TBT) for technical regulations relating to products or PPM characteristics, including 
labels, and under Articles I and III, respectively, of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) for domestic regulations affecting sale of products in a broader sense. For a 
more detailed overview of the WTO rules applicable to border adjustment, see Kateryna 
Holzer “Proposals on carbon-related border adjustments: Prospects for WTO Compliance”, 1 
CCLR (2010), at pp. 51-64. 
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From a legal perspective PPM based BCAs face perhaps the steepest hurdles. First, 
PPM-related taxes are neither direct nor purely indirect taxes but rather a separate, 
third, category of taxes called occulte taxes37. The question of whether occulte taxes 
can be adjusted have not been agreed upon by WTO members. Therefore, the legality 
of adjusting these taxes at the border is questionable.  
 
Second, on the import side, the assessment of compliance with the National Treatment 
(NT) and MFN requirements relies on the outcomes of the products’ likeness test. In 
simple terms, for judgment of compliance with the NT provisions, likeness between an 
imported product at issue and a like domestic product (or between groups of imported 
and domestic products at issue) must first be established, while for an MFN violation, 
likeness between an imported product at issue and a like imported product of another 
origin (or between groups of products of different origin) needs first to be found.38 
The likeness test is liable to find that no matter how the product is produced – with 
high emissions or low emissions technology, products with the same physical 
properties, end uses, consumer perceptions and tariff classification (the four criteria of 
likeness that have constantly been relied upon by WTO panels and the AB) are like 
products. Once this determination has been made, the treatment between like products 
is compared in order to judge if there is discrimination under NT rules – which 
involves comparing imported products against their domestic counterparts, and under 
MFN rules – which involves comparing imported products of one origin against 
imported products of another origin. Consequently, steel produced in the exporting 
country X using the high carbon-emitting technology of a basic oxygen furnace will 
probably be found to be like a product produced in the importing country Y using the 
modern technology of electric arc furnace and, as the steel produced in country X 
                                                 
37 Taxes occultes are defined in the report of the GATT Working Party on Border Tax 
Adjustments as taxes, which include consumption taxes on capital equipment, auxiliary 
materials and services used in the transportation and production of other taxable goods, for 
example, taxes on energy, machinery, transport and advertising. See GATT Working Party 
Report on BTAs (1970), para. 15. 
38 There is a large body of WTO jurisprudence related to the issue of likeness and 
discrimination under the GATT. Key cases on GATT Article III:2 (the national treatment 
obligation with respect to application of internal taxes or charges) include Japan-Alcoholic 
Beverages II (DS8, DS10, DS11). Korea – Alcoholic Beverages (DS75, DS84), India-Additional 
Duties (DS360), Philippines-Distilled Spirits (DS396, DS403).  For GATT Article III:4 (the 
national treatment obligation with respect to internal regulations), see EC-Asbestos (DS135), 
Korea-Various Measures on Beef (DS161, DS169), Dominican Republic – Import and Sales of 
Cigarette (DS302). For GATT Article I (the MFN obligation), see Indonesia-Autos (DS54, DS55, 
DS59, DS64), Canada-Autos (DS139, 142).  
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would be subject to a larger tax, it is expected to be found to be discriminatory against 
steel from that country. 
 
WTO law also allows border adjustments on exportation of goods. A border 
adjustment on exportation is usually made in the form of export rebates of or an 
exemption from taxes which would have been levied on the same products had they 
been destined for domestic consumption. This is a widespread practice for Value 
Added Taxes (VATs) and excise duties. From a WTO law perspective, border 
adjustments on exportation are subject to the MFN rules and WTO disciplines on 
subsidies. In addition to the issues posed by MFN rules described previously, export 
rebates may run afoul of rules on subsidies. Furthermore, for a tax to be adjustable on 
exportation, a tax or charge should be “borne by the product”.39 Whether carbon taxes 
imposed in connection with PPMs, particularly the carbon-intensity of the production 
process, can qualify as “borne by the product” is an open question.   
 
Thus, all in all, there is a high possibility that BCAs based on PPMs would fail to 
comply with the WTO legal framework for border adjustments.  
 
The least discriminatory BCA design would be based on BAT. Border adjustments set 
at the BAT level would likely translate into the lowest tax rates for imported 
products.40 In this case, the tax level would be equal to or below what like domestic 
products face, hence imported products would not be discriminated against like 
domestic products.41
 
Second-best with respect to the risk of discrimination claims would be the PMP 
method. However, under the PMP, the situation where the actual carbon footprint of 
imported products is lower than what it would be deemed to be under the PMP is more 
likely to occur than under the BAT. As such, measures would need to be taken to 
avoid discrimination claims, for example, the BCA scheme of the importing country 
could give foreign producers/importers the option of submitting information on their 
                                                 
39 According to Article VI:4 and Ad Article XVI of the GATT and footnote 1 of the WTO 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM). 
40 Roland Ismer and Karsten Neuhoff, “Border tax adjustment: a feasible way to address 
nonparticipation in emission trading”, CMI Working Paper 36 (University of Cambridge 2004), at pp. 
15-16, available on the Internet at http://econpapers.repec-org/paper/camcamdae/0409.htm (last 
accessed on 18 March 2012). 
41 Ibid. 
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products actual carbon footprint in the case where their actual emissions are lower 
than the PMP.42  
 
Adjustments made based on the average emissions in the corresponding sector of the 
importing country might be more discriminatory than the PMP method because 
imported products may gain less favourable treatment than the treatment received by 
the majority of locally produced products. Such an average can be challenged in the 
WTO. Moreover, from the perspective of the NT requirement the problem with both a 
PMP based BCA and the emissions average is that imported products would be taxed 
in excess of some of the like domestic products (under the classical concept of 
likeness), particularly those like domestic products produced with the emissions below 
the PMP or the average level of emissions benchmarks.43
 
It should be noted that for any of these methods, GATT Article XX could be used to 
defend violations of rules of the GATT. GATT Article XX provides for general 
exceptions to the GATT disciplines under certain conditions. To be eligible for the 
exceptions, BCAs would need to be acknowledged by a WTO panel or the Appellate 
Body as measures necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health44, and/or 
as measures related to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources45. It is likely 
that BCAs could meet both of these provisions. Carbon pricing is put in place to 
protect people from the increased frequency and scale of natural disasters and their 
health from the increased scale of tropical diseases as a result of global warming. In 
addition, the climate may be viewed as an exhaustible resource, the conservation of 
which is the objective of carbon pricing.  
 
However, there are other conditions under Article XX, with which BCAs would have 
more difficulty complying with. The chapeau of Article XX requires that measures not 
                                                 
42 ZhongXiang Zhang, “Encouraging Developing Country Involvement in a Post-2012 Climate Change 
Regime: Carrots, Sticks or Both?” in Climate and Trade Policies in a Post-2012 World (UNEP 2009) at 
p. 83. 
 
43 When examining a measure on discrimination under Art. III:2 (i.e. a tax or charge), WTO panels and 
the AB are more likely to compare treatment of an imported product with any like domestic product 
(e.g. India-Additional Duties, paras 211-214), rather than a group of imported with a group of like 
domestic products as they do when examining a measure under Art. III:4 (i.e. a regulation) (e.g. See 
EC-Asbestos, AB report, para. 100). See Lorand Bartels, “The Inclusion of Aviation in the EU ETS: 
WTO Law Considerations”, Issue Paper no. 6 (ICTSD Global Platform on Climate Change, Trade and 
Sustainable Energy, ICTSD 2011), at p. 6. 
44 Under para. b) of Article XX. 
45 Under para. g) of Article XX. 
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to be applied “in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised 
restriction on international trade”. The imposition of BCAs, if those BCAs are based 
on PPMs, will affect some exporting countries (e.g. those with higher trade volumes of 
carbon-intensive products) more than others. To justify such discrimination, even if it 
is only de facto, could be difficult, especially if those countries are employing 
emissions reduction policies such as export taxes, energy-intensity targets etc.46 It 
would also be difficult to justify given the climate protection principle of common but 
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities agreed on by the global 
climate community.47 Therefore, to win the case of BCAs in the WTO dispute 
settlement will not be an easy task.  
 
III. PTAs and Climate Change 
 
Where PTAs overlap with climate change is two-fold. First, they reduce tariffs, in 
particular on industrial goods, the same goods that may be subject to carbon costs in 
developed countries. Second, they can contain environmental provisions related to 
climate change.  
 
1. Tariff Reductions 
 
Most PTAs include measures that would eliminate tariffs on industrial goods. For 
example, under the recently completed EU – South Korea FTA, the EU will eliminate 
all of its import tariffs on industrial goods within five years and South Korea would 
remove all of its tariffs within seven years.48 More generally, a review of PTAs in 
place by both the US and EU found that existing PTAs provide for nearly 100% 
elimination of all tariffs on industrial goods.49
 
                                                 
46 Joost Pauwelyn, “U.S. Federal Climate Policy and Competitiveness Concerns: the Limits and Options 
of International Trade Law” (Nicholas Institute for Environmental Policy Solutions, Duke University 
2007), at pp. 37-41, available on the Internet at 
http://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/climate/policydesign/u.s.-federal-climate-policy-and-competitiveness-
concerns-the-limits-and-options-of-international-trade-law (last accessed on 30 April 2012). 
 
47 Article 3.1 of the UNFCCC. 
48 W.H. Cooper et al., The EU-South Korea Free Trade Agreement and Its Implications for the United 
States, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress (2011), at p. 12. 
49 R.J. Ahearn, Europe’s Preferential Trade Agreements: Status, Content, and Implications, 
Congressional Research Service Report for Congress (2011), at pp. 15-16. 
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While these tariff reductions will have benefits for both parties, developed country 
industries may be concerned about the competitiveness impacts of allowing increased 
access to their markets. For example in the debate leading up to the conclusion of the 
US-South Korea trade agreement, the U.S. steel industry registered a strongly negative 
position on the agreement, citing at least in part, the on sided nature of the agreement 
with respect to the American automotive industry.50  
 
Climate policy raises competitiveness concerns for the same industries as those that 
are most affected by PTAs, including for example iron and steel, aluminum, cement 
and chemicals51.  The proliferation of climate policies will therefore only exacerbate 
the competitiveness concerns that arise through the creation of PTAs.   
 
From the perspective of EU companies BCAs lessen the competitiveness impacts on 
industry which might be particularly important in the face of increased competition 
from PTAs. From the perspective of developing nations, a PTA might mitigate some 
of the competitiveness impacts of BCAs. As a result, in some ways, the combination 
of BCAs and FTAs provides an opportunity for a win-win outcome.  
 
2. Climate Provisions in PTAs 
 
Recently a body of work is emerging on the role of climate policy in regional and 
bilateral economic arrangements. Among the most discussed is a proposal by Chatham 
House in 2008 for carbon free trade zones. These zones would be designed to “create 
an enabling environment for large-scale innovative low carbon private and public 
investment”.52 These zones, modeled on Special Economic Zones, would primarily 
benefit the development of low carbon technologies.53  
 
Other work on this issue has classed the use of bi-lateral and uni-lateral action into 
three types, the first modeled on the Chatham House proposal, the second, the 
                                                 
50 Supra note 49, at pg. 26 
51 For a list of sectors identified by the EU as at risk of carbon leakage see 2010/2/:Commission 
Decision of 24 December 2009 determining, pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council, a list of sectors and subsectors which are deemed to be exposed to a 
significant risk of carbon leakage (notified under document C(2009) 10251) Text with EEA relevance.
52 Chatham House and E3G, Low Carbon Zones - A transformational agenda for China and Europe 
(2008), at p. 9 available on the Internet at http://www.e3g.org/images/uploads/Low_Carbon_Zones_EU-
China_cooperation.pdf (last accessed on 18 March 2012). 
53 Ibid., at p. 9. 
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unilateral imposition of BCAs and a third modeled on the methods in the Montreal 
Protocol, where a group of nations would agree on the extent of environmental action 
and impose sanctions or other forms of injurious trade measures against those parties 
that do not become parties to the agreement.54
 
An additional area where bilateral negotiations might be useful with respect to climate 
policies is where two countries agree to establish emissions reduction systems (e.g. 
ETSs) in their territories. In this case, provisions may be included in PTAs or other 
bilateral agreements to ensure the mutual recognition of the countries policies and 
avoid any future trade measures between countries.55
 
There is little work that has been done to explore the possibility of using PTAs to 
impose BCAs. The remainder of the paper focuses on this aspect - how PTAs could 
potentially be used to put in place BCAs in order to address issues related to carbon 
leakage and competitiveness concerns. 
 
IV. BCAs in PTAs 
 
There are several high-level reasons why including BCAs in bilateral PTAs would be 
more appropriate than either imposing them unilaterally or negotiating them through 
multi-lateral agreements. However while the rationale for implementing BCAs in 
PTAs may be strong, there are none-the–less a number of implementation hurdles that 
would need to be surmounted in order for them to be truly feasible. The following 
discusses both the rationale for, and the implementation issues with, the imposition of 
BCAs in PTAs. 
 
1. Rationale for including BCAs in PTAs 
 
There are a number of strong arguments for including BCAs in PTAs. Currently BCA 
proposals are generally considered for application unilaterally. However, many claim 
that such unilateral measures will provoke trade retaliatory measures that can be 
harmful to economies at large and, in the worst case scenario, result in a full out trade 
                                                 
54 Y. Dong and J. Whalley, Carbon, Trade Policy, and Carbon Free Trade Areas (2008), at pp. 4-5. 
55 Peter Holmes, Tom Reilly and Jim Rollo, “Border carbon adjustments and the potential for 
protectionism”, 11 Climate Policy (2011). 
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war.56 As such, while the unilateral imposition of BCAs is certainly a possibility, it 
carries many risks.  A further argument against applying BCAs unilaterally is that, 
while competitiveness and carbon leakage concerns arise from concern over a 
country’s largest trading partners being without commensurate climate costs, BCAs 
would impose those costs on all countries, even countries with very small market 
shares. This method may be unnecessary from the perspective of protecting 
competitiveness.  
 
A multi-lateral agreement on the conditions under which BCAs would be applied is 
the ideal solution as it would avoid any retaliatory measures.57 However, multi-lateral 
forums can be cumbersome to negotiate in and therefore can take time to come to 
agreement. The Doha round of WTO negotiations, which began in 2001, is in its 
eleventh year of negotiation and is in dire straits; while the negotiations are officially 
ongoing many are declaring them dead.58 Similarly, while the latest UNFCCC 
conference in Durban did reach agreements on the continuation of the Kyoto Protocol, 
the establishment of a green fund on climate change and a commitment to reach a 
legally binding agreement by 2015, there is still some skepticism that the forum can 
yield real results.59 It is also questionable whether the UNFCCC could provide a 
useful negotiating forum for managing trade related measures such as BCAs. 
 
Finally, the application of BCAs in PTAs may have advantages from a legal 
perspective, that is, there may be more flexibility with respect to trade law in PTAs 
than there is for provisions applied within the WTO legal framework.  Most 
importantly, the application of BCAs only between PTA parties will not constitute a 
violation of the MFN principle, as the non-MFN application of “duties and other 
restrictive regulations of commerce” is allowed when the measures are taken under a 
PTA. Therefore, from a WTO compliance perspective, the application of BCAs under 
                                                 
56 News reports have widely criticized these measures, pointing to their potential trade 
ramifications see for example “Climate issues at WTO may lead to ‘trade war’”, Business 
Standard, June 14, 2010 and “One easy way to start a trade war”, Financial Times, Editorial, 
December 9, 2009. 
57 J. Werksman et al., Trade Measures and Climate Change Policy: Searching for Common Ground on 
an Uneven Playing Field (World Resources Institute 2009). 
58 News reports following the failure of agreement in 2011 have widely reported the talks as stalled, see 
for example  L. Herman and G.C. Hufbauer, “Doha is Dead”, Foreign Policy, 26 September 2011, and 
“The Doha Round - Dead Man Talking”, The Economist, 28 April 2011.  
59 “Cool response to Durban compromise”, 2 Nature Climate Change (2012), at p. 59.  
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a PTA eliminates the risks of violation of GATT Article I, which, as discussed above, 
is likely in the case of the application of BCAs in non-preferential trade. 
 
It should be noted that from a strictly legal perspective there are hurdles to the 
implementation of BCAs that would prevail even in the case of implementation 
through PTAs. Except for the allowed derogation of the MFN principle, all other 
WTO rules regulating the application of BCAs are supposed to be followed. The 
violation of WTO rules applicable to BCAs might only be excused, if it could be 
argued that the PTA could not have been concluded, had the provisions on the 
application of BCAs not been included in the agreement.60 This situation is hard to 
imagine; it is much more likely that BCAs act as an obstacle to the conclusion of a 
PTA, which a developed country manages to overcome by offering something else in 
compensation to its PTA partners.61  
 
Furthermore, since BCAs are meant to apply only to trade among PTA parties, they 
would constitute trade restrictions on internal trade between PTA parties, and, hence, 
would be subject to the so-called “internal requirement” for regional liberalization 
contained in paragraph 8 of GATT Article XXIV.62 GATT Article XXIV:8 requires 
that for free trade areas “duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce (except, 
where necessary, those permitted under Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV and XX) are 
eliminated with respect to substantially all the trade between the constituent 
territories”. Despite the existing uncertainties among WTO members with respect to 
the meaning of “other restrictive regulations of commerce” and “substantially all the 
                                                 
60 The Appellate Body in the Turkey-Textiles case (Turkey - Restrictions on Imports of Textile and 
Clothing Products, WT/DS34/AB/R, para. 58) held that  
 “…Article XXIV may justify a measure which is inconsistent with certain other GATT provisions. 
However, in a case involving the formation of a customs union, this "defence" is available only when 
two conditions are fulfilled. First, the party claiming the benefit of this defence must demonstrate that 
the measure at issue is introduced upon the formation of a customs union that fully meets the 
requirements of sub-paragraphs 8(a) and 5(a) of Article XXIV. And, second, that party must 
demonstrate that the formation of that customs union would be prevented if it were not allowed to 
introduce the measure at issue. Again, both these conditions must be met to have the benefit of the 
defence under Article XXIV”.60 (italics added).  
 
61 It should be noted that this scenario could be averted should the carbon price be applied 
through import duties rather than BTAs, as in this case the NT obligation would not apply. 
However, for the sake of brevity, this paper does not delve into the details of other 
formulations of BCAs.  
62 The „external requirement“ contained in paragraph 5 of GATT Article XXIV applies only to 
measures („duties and other regulations of commerce“) imposed upon the formation of a PTA on non-
parties (i.e. third countries). 
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trade”63, it is likely that not only carbon import duties but also carbon import taxes and 
importer allowance requirement would fall into the scope of Article XXIV:8 and as 
such would violate the requirement of “substantially all the trade” liberalization.  
 
From a legal perspective, these problems could be surmounted through recource to the 
exception clauses under GATT Article XX, which, as discussed earlier, are still 
available provided that the BCAs meet the requirements of Article XX, including 
those of the Chapeau.64.  
 
Despite the probability of a conflict of BCAs taken under a PTA with WTO rules, the 
likelihood of their challenge in the WTO is low, making the application of BCAs 
under a PTA a more attractive policy choice compared to the unilateral application of 
BCAs on an MFN basis across the board. If BCA provisions are included in a PTA, it 
seems logical that PTA parties accept these measures as previously agreed, and 
provided their application follows the agreed rules and criteria, will not complain 
about them in the PTA dispute settlement or at the WTO. With respect to non-parties 
to a PTA, they would have no reason to complain as long as BCAs are applied only to 
trade between PTA parties and, hence, do not nullify or impair benefits to third parties 
under the WTO Agreement. For these reasons, while the legal hurdles remain, due to 
the practical limits on the likelyhood of any breaches in law being brought to dispute 
resolution, implementing BCAs trough PTAs could be far more feasible than if done 
unilaterally.  
 
2. Implementing BCAs in PTAs 
 
The largest barrier to using PTAs to impose BCAs is with respect to its effect on trade 
flows. Border adjustments are in general applied across the board. That is when a BCA 
                                                 
63 Neither GATT/WTO panels and the Appellate Body, nor GATT contracting parties/WTO members 
through negotiations in GATT working parties on RTAs or the modern day WTO Committee on 
Regional Trade Agreements could so far have clarified the meaning of the terms. For instance, pursuant 
to the holding of the AB in the Turkey-Textile dispute, the “substantially all the trade” is likely to be 
assessed in terms of both quantity (trade volumes) and quality (sectoral coverage). Yet, how much or 
how inclusive it has to be, there is no agreement. In terms of quantity, for example, various benchmarks 
of 80, 90 and 95% of total trade have been proposed. See Petros C. Mavroidis, “If I Don’t Do It, 
Somebody Else Will (Or Won’t): Testing the Compliance of Preferential Trade Agreements With the 
Multilateral Rules”, 40(1) Journal of World Trade (2006), at p. 200. 
64 It should be noted that a country imposing a BCA measure under a PTA could seek defense under 
Article XX also for other possible violations of GATT rules, including the national treatment principle. 
In this case, the defense would follow the usual course under Article XX, previously described for 
BCAs taken in non-preferential trade. 
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is put in place it taxes all imports regardless of their country of origin and rebates 
funds on all exports regardless of the destination of those exports. If BCAs were to be 
applied to only one nation they could result in a rerouting of trade flows from the 
country with the PTA in place through third countries. For example suppose country A 
has a stringent climate policy in place and decides through a PTA to impose BCAs on 
imports from country B that has no policy in place. Leaving aside for the moment the 
rationale as to why country B might agree to such an arrangement, if the BCAs are 
higher than the MFN tariff rates applied to the imports of those products from other 
countries, there is no reason why producers from country B would not simply export 
their products first to a third party who would then export them to country A at the 
lower MFN rates. As a result in general a BCA applied only to one country could be 
ineffective. However, whether or not the rerouting of trade would in fact occur will 
depend on the BCA levels, which will in turn depend on the design of the BCA, the 
sectors to which they are applied and the carbon price. 
 
In addition, there may be ways for BCAs to be imposed in bilateral agreements and to 
avert the rerouting of trade flows.   
 
1) Rules of origin – MFN rates apply to products regardless of their origin. It 
may be possible to adjust the rules of origin such that products from a 
country receive the carbon related rates (i.e. PTA rates that are higher than 
the MFN rates) rather than the MFN rates regardless of which country the 
products were finally imported from. For example should a PTA conclude 
that products from a certain country would receive the larger than MFN 
carbon related rates, rules of origin could state that these rates apply to 
products where the majority of value was added in that country, regardless 
of the final point of import. There are several complications with this 
option, most notably the legality of such a system as well as how to entice a 
country to accept through its PTA a higher than MFN tariff rate for some of 
its products.  
 
2) Carbon rates that are less than MFN rates – In a PTA tariff rates on most 
products are adjusted to zero. However, if in the case of a BCA, the net 
tariff rates on certain emissions intensive products are not adjusted to zero 
but to some other rate that is below the MFN tariff levels the deflection of 
trade flows to third parties would not occur. This may not result in the full 
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pricing of carbon and therefore may not address all competitiveness 
concerns fully, however it would take the first step towards addressing the 
issue. 
 
Finally, PTAs may be useful in applying BCAs even in the situation where BCAs are 
not applied in a bilateral agreement. Specifically they may provide a useful forum for 
negotiations with the largest trading partner. That is, even where a BCA is applied to 
all nations it is the largest trading partner or partners of the country imposing the BCA 
that are likely to have the greatest objection to the measure. Therefore, including 
BCAs as part of a PTA negotiation could enable the country imposing the BCA to 
work out the design details to the satisfaction of its largest trading partner and 
potentially offer concessions to elicit agreement to the BCA. While this does not 
eliminate all potential trade related conflicts over its imposition, it may eliminate the 
bulk of them, making this a useful endeavour. It could also serve as the forum through 
which a country could try to entice a second party to impose stringent climate policies 
of its own. However in order for this to be effective the threat would need to be 
credible, i.e. the country would have to be willing to put in place the BCAs unilaterally 
regardless of the outcome of the negotiation.  
 
The remainder of this section will explore each of the ways in which BCAs may be 
usefully employed in PTAs in detail reviewing both the economic and legal 
implications and giving examples as to how they might work in practice.  
 
a. Rerouting of trade flows 
 
Whether trade flows will be rerouted as a result of the unilateral imposition of BCAs 
will depend on the magnitude of the BCA, that is, whether the BCA rate is above or 
below the MFN tariff rate. This in turn will depend on a number of factors including, 
the sector to which it is applied, the carbon price and whether the tariff level is set 
based on the emissions intensity of the importing country or the exporting country.  
 
Some analyses have been completed in an attempt to judge the magnitude of BCAs, 
however the results vary widely. A study by Dong and Whaley found that the 
magnitude of BTAs applied in the EU for high emissions intensity goods would range 
from 0.36% to 2.9% for carbon prices ranging from $25 per tonne to $200 per tonne.65 
                                                 
65 Y. Dong and J. Whalley, “How Large are the Impacts of Carbon Motivated Border Tax 
Adjustments? ” Economic Policy Research Institute Working Paper no. 2009-3, available on the 
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However this study notes that the values would be significantly higher if indirect 
emissions and the emissions intensities in the exporting country were to be used.  
 
A second study from the Center for Global Development shows results that are 
significantly higher. It finds that in order for industrialized countries to reduce 
emissions by 17%, BTAs imposed on energy intensive manufacturing in China could 
range from around 7% when the carbon intensity of the importing country is used to 
over 40% when the carbon intensity of the exporting country is used. However this 
analysis was premised on a carbon price exceeding $300 per tonne.66 Finally, a study 
from the International Institute for Sustainable Development looked at the steel sector 
in China specifically and found that for a $20 per tonne carbon price a BTA of around 
8% would be needed.  
 
We have completed a basic analysis to give an illustrative example of the rates that 
would be necessary for BCAs using trade volumes from the World Integrated Trade 
Solutions (WITS) database and emission intensity figures from an OECD study. 67 The 
analysis uses average emissions intensities by sector for both China and the EU to give 
an idea of what a BAT-style or a PPM-style BCA would look like. Therefore what is 
deemed to be a PPM-style BCA could also be a BCA set based on the PMP or average 
emissions of the exporting country and what is deemed a BAT-style BCA could also 
be a BCA based on PMP or average emissions of the importing country.   
 
Table 1 shows a basic calculation of BCAs applied to steel and aluminum exports 
from China into the EU. It also shows the MFN tariff rates for these products. For steel 
the MFN tariff rates are already very low and the emissions intensity of steel 
                                                                                                                                             
Internet at  http://economics.uwo.ca/centres/epri/wp2009/dong_whalley_03.pdf (last accessed on 18 March 
2012). 
66 A. Mattoo et al., “Reconciling Climate Change and Trade”, Policy Center for Global 
Development Working Paper 189, available on the Internet at 
http://www.cgdev.org/files/1423204_file_Subramanian_Climate_and_Trade_FINAL.pdf (last accessed on 18 
March 2012). 
67 Emissions intensities from N. Ahmad and A. Wyckoff “Carbon Dioxide Emissions Embodied in 
International Trade of Goods”, OECD Science, Technology and Industry Working Papers, 2003/15 
(OECD Publishing 2003), at p. 26. Trade volumes from World Integrated Trade Solutions Database 
http://wits.worldbank.org/wits/, 2010 trade volumes. The carbon price used in this analysis is $20/tonne. 
Current carbon prices in the EU ETS are around 12-13 euros, or $16-$17/tonne. Estimates find that the 
EU ETS 2020 target should be able to be met with only a small increase in this price. However, higher 
prices will likely be necessary to meet targets in the post 2020 period. See Press Release: Emissions are 
Under Priced in Europe, Bloomberg New Energy Finance, September 13th, 2011, available on the 
Internet at http://www.newenergyfinance.com/PressReleases/view/165 (last accessed on 18 March 
2012). 
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production is high both in China and in the EU. As a result in almost all cases the 
BCAs for steel would likely be higher than MFN tariff rates and the unilateral 
imposition of such adjustments would likely result in the rerouting of trade flows, 
albeit in our calculation the BAT based BCA on steel is not much higher than the 
MFN tariff rate. However, the case is different for aluminum where existing tariffs are 
higher and the emissions intensity of production is lower. In this case, for lower 
carbon costs, or where BCAs are of BAT-style, it is possible that BCAs would be 
lower than MFN tariff rates and the unilateral imposition of BCAs would in fact be 
feasible.  
 
Table 1 Calculation of BCAs applied to steel and aluminum exports from China 
into the EU68
 
Scenario description Aluminum Steel
Existing MFN Tariffs ‐ no carbon price 6.5% 1.7%
Carbon Price applied to all Chinese emissions ($20/tonne) 6.8% 12.7%
Carbon Price applied to EU emissions ($20/tonne) 0.6% 2.3%
Current Tariffs
PPM style tax applied to all emissions
BAT style tax applied to all emissions
 
 
Therefore, it is likely that the chances of trade deflection that would result from a BCA 
applied to only one country would depend on the sector to which the BCA is applied, 
the manner in which it is applied and the carbon price. Because the emissions intensity 
of production is lower in the EU than in many developing countries, using a BAT-
style method for applying BCAs may be sufficient to avoid the rerouting of trade 
flows and enable BCAs to be applied to single countries rather than across the board.  
However, further sector specific analysis would be necessary to confirm this result. 
 
b. Rules of origin 
 
Rules of origin are a common feature in PTAs. They are primarily used to avoid a 
particular type of trade deflection, that is, to avoid countries selling their products 
through third parties in order to take advantage of low tariffs in the PTA. For example, 
the South Korea-EU FTA sets out rules that define the extent to which goods not 
wholly originating in South Korea can qualify for FTA provisions. Rules of origin 
                                                 
68 Emissions intensities from Ahmad, N. and A. Wyckoff (2003), “Carbon Dioxide Emissions Embodied 
in International Trade of Goods”, OECD Science, Technology and Industry Working Papers, 2003/15, OECD 
Publishing, p. 26. Trade volumes from World Integrated Trade Solutions Database 
http://wits.worldbank.org/wits/, 2010 trade volumes.  
 
23 
may also be useful in applying BCAs if they were to be applied selectively to certain 
countries. That is, should a BCA be applied to a single country or a series of countries 
rather than all trading partners, and if those BCAs were to be set above current MFN 
tariff rates there is the serious risk that goods from the country to which the BCA is 
applied would simply be shipped to a third party and then to the final destination in 
order to take advantage of MFN tariff rates rather than the higher BCA rates. In order 
to avoid this situation, rules of origin could be used to discriminate between goods 
originating in different countries. For example if a BCA were applied against Chinese 
goods, then that BCA could be applied to goods where the majority of value added 
was in China, regardless of where the goods were finally exported from. If such rules 
of origin could be designed it would allow for BCAs to be set above MFN tariff rates 
for selected countries. This would be especially useful where BCAs would be set 
based on PPMs for highly carbon-intensity products such as steel. Of course, as 
mentioned earlier such a design would require that the country imposing the BCA 
provide sufficient incentives through concessions in its PTA to the country to which 
these BCAs would be applied against, to entice the country to in fact sign on to such a 
provision.  
 
With respect to the legal implications of the rules of origin approach to trade 
deflection, there are no WTO disciplines on rules of origin used in PTAs (preferential 
RoOs).69 Therefore, in principle, WTO members are free to design RoOs in their 
PTAs as they want.70 For this reason, this work around may in fact be feasible. 
 
However, beyond the barriers posed by designing rules of origin, setting BCA rates 
above MFN tariff rates may result in other legal isues. Specifically, setting BCA rates 
in a PTA above MFN tariff rates is likely to be found not only in violation of the 
“substantially all the trade” requirement of Article XXIV:8 but, in the case where 
                                                 
69 There are WTO disciplines on the preparation and application of non-preferential RoOs, 
which are contained in the WTO Agreement on Rules of Origin (RoOs Agreement) attached to 
Annex 1 of the WTO Agreement. The disciplines however are quite general. Pursuant to 
Article 5 of the Agreement on Rules of Origin, it is allowed to change and introduce new RoOs 
provided that this is duly notified to the WTO Secretariat. 
70 The multitude of diverse and sometimes overlapping RoOs in PTAs increase transaction 
costs for firms and make their use of preferences offered by PTAs difficult or even impossible. 
Preferential RoOs are thus often viewed as a significant trade barrier, which dillutes effects of 
liberalisation in PTAs. Consequently, the liberty of setting RoOs is perceived in the WTO as 
the wrong tradition, which has to be corrected through WTO negotiations aimed at 
harmonisation of preferential RoOs via use of cumulation rules. See World Trade Report 2011 
at note 2, at pp. 83, 108-109, 188. 
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BCA rates exceed bound tariffs in the country’s Schedule of Concessions, it might 
also constitute a violation of GATT Article II. Yet, the measure might be justified 
under general exceptions of GATT Article XX. However, given that we assume 
agreement has been reached on these levels through the PTA, it may be unlikely to 
face any challenge. 
 
A secondary issue that arises from the selective application of BCAs is the question of 
how national exports will be treated. In the unilateral imposition of BCAs export 
rebates are given to all exporters of carbon-intensive goods regardless of the 
destination of these goods. However, in the bilateral imposition of BCAs the question 
arises as to whether rebates should still given in this way or whether they ought to be 
given only to those exports destined for the PTA partner. Depending on market shares, 
export rebates may need to be applied to all countries to which those products are 
destined, even if import BCAs are being applied to only one country. However, there 
is no provision in the WTO Agreement saying that an export-side border adjustment 
(BA) must always accompany import-side BA, i.e. import BAs can arguably be 
applied without parallel rebates on exportation. In addition, it is possible that rebates 
applied as selective export rebates (in PTAs) could still be effective, as in the case 
where the PTA partners is the largest export market for the particular products of a 
BCA-imposing country. 
 
c. Carbon rates less than MFN rates 
 
A second possible role for PTAs in negotiating BCAs is to use the PTAs to set BCA 
rates below current MFN tariff rates but above zero. This possibility is premised on 
the idea that PTAs that move the tariff rates on industrial products to zero are likely to 
occur anyways, as a result setting BCAs above zero but below MFN rates would be an 
improvement on the status quo from a carbon pricing perspective. Under this scenario, 
the PTA would still provide benefits to the developing country sectors concerned but 
not to the same extent as would occur had the tariffs been lowered to zero as would be 
the case in an ordinary free trade agreement. The primary issue with this method is 
that tariffs on many products are already low, which means that by taking this method 
tariffs would likely be set below the actual carbon costs.  
 
For example, the average MFN tariffs on imports of raw steel by the EU from China 
are very low, 0.13%, the average tariffs on steel products are higher but still not 
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substantive at 2.31%.71 While the tariffs on steel products are significantly below the 
12.7% that would be necessary to capture the carbon costs using a $20 per tonne price 
applied to Chinese emissions, when that cost is applied using an EU emissions 
intensity, a metric that is comparable to using a BAT or PMP mode of levying tariffs, 
the tariff rates would only need to be 1.1%, a level that would allow for a reduction in 
MFN tariff levels.72
 
This may also be a more feasible way forward for other sectors. For example the 
aluminum sector has much higher tariff levels than the steel sector, with average MFN 
rates on the order of 6.5%.73 It is also a sector with lower emissions intensities, a $20 
per tonne carbon tax applied to Chinese emissions from the aluminum sector would 
require a 6.8% tariff.74 Therefore a BCA set slightly below the PPM based BCA 
would still capture the majority of carbon costs but would be low enough to provide 
some advantage from the PTA to developing countries.  
 
From a legal perspective, provided BCAs are set below MFN tariff rates and provided 
that the inclusion of BCAs in a PTA in this manner is found to satisfy “the essentially 
all the trade” rule of GATT Article XXIV:8, such a BCAs design would not face any 
legal hurdles. For this reason this option may be the most feasible from the perspective 
of its practicality.  
 
d. Negotiations with the largest trading partner 
 
Negotiations with the largest trading partners could prove helpful in garnering support 
for BCAs applied across the board. For many of the industries that are most vulnerable 
to carbon leakage and competitiveness impacts a few trading partners make up the 
bulk of trade, meaning that working with these countries could go a long way towards 
building support for the BCAs.  
 
                                                 
71 World Integrated Trade Solutions Database http://wits.worldbank.org/wits/
72 Based on data from Emissions intensities from N. Ahmad and A. Wyckoff 2003 and trade 
data from World Integrated Trade Solutions Database http://wits.worldbank.org/wits/, 2010 trade 
volumes. 
73 World Integrated Trade Solutions Database http://wits.worldbank.org/wits/
74 Based on data from Emissions intensities from N. Ahmad and A. Wyckoff 2003 and trade 
data from World Integrated Trade Solutions Database http://wits.worldbank.org/wits/, 2010 trade 
volumes. 
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For raw iron and steel the top 5 exporting countries to the EU made up almost 50% of 
EU imports in 2010. For products of iron and steel the top three exporting countries 
make up 50% of EU imports. For both of these categories China is the largest 
exporting country to the EU, making up 36% of imports of iron and steel products and 
15% of imports of raw iron and steel. 75  As a result, for example, the EU working 
with China to gain support for a BCA could be helpful in ensuring widespread 
acceptance of the BCA. However, the extent to which negotiations will be successful 
will depend on the ability to, to some extent, compensate for these economic impacts. 
 
PTAs are expected to have significant economic benefits. The EU-South Korea FTA is 
estimated to result in increased imports to the EU from South Korea of up to 34 billion 
euros and to increase exports from the EU to South Korea of between 33 and 41 
billion euros.76 The trade benefits of a PTA with larger countries are likely to yield 
even larger benefits. A simple analysis of reducing tariffs on all non-agriculture goods 
imported by the EU from China would yield over 20 billion in trade benefits.77 This 
value does not include any tariff reductions on agriculture products or services but is 
none the less substantial. By contrast a 12.7% tariff on all the steel imports from China 
amounts to less than 1.5 billion USD, an additional reduction in steel trade of 10% 
would add an extra 1 billion USD to the total.78 Thus, even with conservative 
estimates of zero cost pass through and large reductions in trade, the costs of added 
tariffs on this important sector are much smaller than the gains that could be achieved 
by a PTA.  
 
For these reasons, it would seem that PTAs may provide valuable benefits in excess of 
the costs of carbon tariffs and as a result could provide a useful forum to use increased 
access to markets to encourage developing countries to take on the added burden of 
carbon-related border adjustments for the sake of climate change mitigation.  
                                                 
75 World Integrated Trade Solutions Database http://wits.worldbank.org/wits/, 2010 trade volumes. 
76 Y. Decreux, The Economic Impact of the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the European Union 
and Korea, Report for the European Commission (2010), available on the Internet at  
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/may/tradoc_146174.pdf (last accessed on 18 March 2012). 
77 Simulation of the application of zero tariffs on all non-agriculture goods using the SMART 
simulation available World Integrated Trade Solutions Database http://wits.worldbank.org/wits/, 
2010 trade volumes. 
78 Based on data from Emissions intensities from N. Ahmad and A. Wyckoff 2003 and trade 
data from World Integrated Trade Solutions Database http://wits.worldbank.org/wits/, 2010 trade 
volumes. 
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V. Conclusions 
 
PTAs are increasing in prevalence worldwide and in particular between developed and 
developing countries. And, while some analysts are less than pleased with this pattern, 
the move towards these agreements as a backbone for trade liberalization appears to be 
inevitable. In order for stringent climate policies to be put in place the inclusion of 
some method of addressing the competitiveness and carbon leakage concerns of 
specific large industries also seems inevitable, and BCAs are one of the most prevalent 
means of addressing these impacts that has been discussed to date. As a result the 
inclusion of BCAs in PTAs is almost certainly an idea that ought to, at the very least, 
be explored.  
 
The inclusion of BCAs in PTAs has several distinct advantages; it would ensure the 
unilateral imposition of BCAs does not result in full out trade wars, it does not rely on 
cumbersome and often ineffective multi-lateral discussions and it is perhaps more 
legally feasible as it provides a method of, to some extent, circumventing barriers to 
the unilateral BCA implementation posed by WTO rules. However the implementation 
hurdles associated with such a system are not insignificant and would require further 
thought and analysis to ensure they are surmountable.  
 
Of the options explored regarding the role of BCAs in PTA negotiations perhaps the 
most likely and feasible is the use of PTA negotiations as a forum for garnering 
support for unilaterally imposed BCAs. This option presents no legal hurdles nor does 
it create any trade impacts beyond those normally faced by BCAs. The primary 
disadvantage of this option is that it may not be fully effective in avoiding the trade 
retaliatory measures that may arise from the unilateral imposition of BCAs. That is, 
even if the largest trading partners agree to the imposition of a BCA, it does not mean 
that countries with smaller market shares will not none the less voice their discontent 
through retaliatory trade measures.  
 
The second most feasible means of implementing BCAs through bilateral agreements 
is through the imposition of tariff levels that are less than MFN rates but above zero. 
This method would ensure the imposition of the BCA does not result in the rerouting 
of trade and is likely very feasible from a legal perspective. The disadvantage however 
is that due to already low MFN tariff levels it is unlikely that tariffs would capture the 
full carbon costs of imported goods and therefore would not be as effective as desired 
from either an environmental or a competitiveness perspective.  
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Finally other more original solutions such as changes in the rules of origin may be 
possible, however such ideas require further analysis to determine their feasibility due 
to the sheer novelty of such an approach.  
 
This paper provides a first blush look at the possibility of including BCAs in PTAs. 
Clearly further analysis would be required in order to arrive at a true assessment of 
their feasibility. However, it does show that this option has potential and is an area that 
merits further consideration.  
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